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Abstract
This paper has several aims. First, it is a propaedeutic paper concerned with thinking and
understanding the critical accounting literature. Secondly, it examines some inner
contradictions in philosophical assumptions, the problematic 'knowledge claim' and
diversities of perspectives that have been advanced in the critical accounting literature.
Thirdly, a prescriptive understanding of the nature of organisational 'culture' and its
transition processes in order to focus on the necessity of perspective choices is advanced.
Fourthly, it is argued that the concepts of 'organisational change' and 'change in a
(pedagogic) discipline' are not parallel. This view ultimately leads us to argue, from a
'research student perspective', that it is not possible to start a major research study in a
vacuum: it is necessary to examine the history of existing thought and theories of a
discipline in order to focus on a research interest and as well as determine the choice of
the most appropriate research framework. Finally, an example of an evaluation is cited
following a Habermasian critical approach in order to show some possible accounting
interventions and research propositions in the area of (management) accounting and
control systems research in a micro-organisationalcontext
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The call for a more self-reflexive and contextualised accounting literature, which
recognises the interconnections between society, history, organisations, accounting
theory and practice is a recent phenomenon'. The search for a practical (pragmatic)
understanding of the actual functioning of accounting in organisations as well as its
social implications, has in fact emerged as accounting researchers have begun to
challenge the 'positivistic' notion of theory testing in accounting. The positivists'
mathematical models are limited to a few variables and statistical tests constrained by the
available data and are non-reflective in understanding modem organisational and societal
problems. Thus, it is not surprising that accounting researchers have come to realise
"how little we know about the actual functioning of accounting systems in organisations"
(Hopwood [1979, p.145, cf. 1978, 1983, 1986], Burchell et al. [1980], also quoted in
Laughlin [1987 p.479] and Laughlin and Lowe [1990, p.15]).
It is widely accepted that the significance of accounting bears no special connotation
without the existence of organisations. In other words, neither accounting nor
organisations have a significant independent existence; rather, they are complementary
and this in turn has social ramifications (Hopwood [1978, 1983, 1985, 1986]; Burchell et
al. [1980]; Loft [1985]; Neimark and Tinker [1986]; Chua [1986]; Cooper and Hopper
[1987]; Laughlin [1987]). Many actors other than accountants playa significant role
within an organisation (Chua and Degeling [1989]).
Consequently, it is being increasingly realised that the information that is produced from
an accounting enterprise cannot be viewed as value-free or neutral but as value-laden.
This suggests that neither accounting nor organisations can be isolated from the social
contexts in which they exist (Hopwood [1983]). Thus, the traditional view that
accounting is no more than a technical phenomenon is being resisted. It is argued instead
that accounting has wider social ramifications. In. this sense it becomes necessary in the
accounting research arena, to consider a broader framework or type of work that should
ultimately provide a richer methodological guide-line in enhancing our understanding of.
how accounting works in practice. This necessity has led accounting researchers to
advocate a more diverse range of theoretical and practical issues than in the past and
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which can be denoted as the critical accounting movement. In the following section
attention will be drawn to these issues in order to reflect on the general features of this
new (critical accounting) movement.
The Critical Accounting Movement
The label 'critical accounting movement' is the preferred terminology of MacIntosh
[1988]; others labels have included 'critical accounting literature' (Neimark and Tinker
[1986]), and 'critical studies' (Cooper and Hopper [1987]; Laughlin, Hopper and Miller
[1989]). Laughlin [1987] uses the term 'critical theory' to mean 'critical social theory',
especially German critical theory. Some others also use the term 'critical theory' to mean
French critical theory.
These terminological differences may mean different things to different accounting
theorists/researchers. If the expression 'critical studies' is used in accounting as the
general nomenclature of this progressive movement, it is possible to question the ultimate
concern of 'critical studies' in accounting? In this regard, beside the primary objective,
that is, to challenge 'positivists' epistemology, Cooper and Hopper [1987, pAll] argue
that it is a concern to access the significance of accounting both as a set of everyday
practices and as a series of theoretical discourses central to studies in accounting. A
second concern, they posit, is that "critical studies in accounting (are) frequently
concerned to explicate a theory of interests in understanding accounting practice and
theory" (pAll). This is supported by Laughlin, Hopper and Miller [1989] who argue,
that the notion of critical studies has taken such a form in order "to identify and
document the role that sectional interests play in accounting". In an introduction to a
recently published anthology of 'critical papers' Cooper & Hopper [1990] state that
"critical accounting arose both as an expression of attempts by scholars within
accounting to apply fresh, typically nonfunctionalist, theoretical insights into the effects
of accounting within organisations and society" (p.1).
Since the early 1980s the critical accounting literature has been advancing with a diverse
range of expression as to the theoretical underpining necessary to understanding and
relating accounting theory to practice. One of the main features of this movement has
been that 'theoretical considerations have loomed large' in developing accounting theory,
characterised by a theoretical openness and an awareness of developments in other
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relevant disciplines (Hopwood & Bromwich [1984, p.150]). Cooper and Hopper [1990]
articulate that "critical accounting is critical of conventional accounting theory and
practice and, through critical social science theory, it seeks to explain how the current
state of accounting has come about".
Until recently it has been well accepted by critical accounting researchers that an
understanding of the significance of accounting and its development requires an
examination of its social context. In endeavours to examine such a context some critical
accounting researchers have gone deeper into the various fields of social sciences,
including the sociology of knowledge, and philosophy of science. In so doing, a diverse
range of theoretical and methodological underpining has been brought into the
accounting research arena in order to investigate how accounting is related to society,
politics and organizational functioning. However, it also becomes apparent that there is
an incoherence regarding the 'state of knowledge claim' (i.e. the methodological issues).
In other words, "although there is common agreement amongst them (i.e., critical
accounting researchers) in their rejection of 'functionalist' (in the terminology of Burrell
and Morgan [1979] classifications) thinking, it would be wrong to see the alternative
approaches which they advance as some homogeneous set" (Laughlin and Lowe [1990,
p.35]). A wide range of alternative theoretical approaches has been advanced and
examined in order to enhance understanding and a summary is given below:
(a) those who utilize symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology (cf. Colville
[1981], Berry et al. [1985], Boland and Pondy [1986], Preston [1986], Dent
[1986], Covaleski and Dirsmith [1988], Hines [1988], Jablonsky [1986], Lavoie
[1987], Chua [1988]);
(b) those who rely on political economy (including Marxian) approaches (cf. Cooper
[1980], Tinker [1980], Cooper & Sherer [1984], Neimark & Tinker [1986],
Willmot [1986], Armstrong [1987], Hopper et al. [1987]);
(c) those who propound the merits of Habermasian critical theory (cf. Laughlin
[1984, 1987, 1988, 1990a], MacIntosh [1990], Broadbent et al. [1990], Chua and
Degeling [1990]);
(d) those who utilize Foucauldian approach (cf. Burchell et al. [1985], Hopwood
[1987], Loft [1985], Miller & O'leary [1987], Hoskin & Maeve [1988], Chua &
Degeling [1990], Hopper et al. [1990]);
(e) those who utilize Giddens's structuration theory (cf. Roberts and Scapens [1985],
Capps et al [1989]);
(f) those who utilizes Clegg's concept of power analysis (cf. Booth [1988]),
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(g) those who utilize Gramsci's concept of hegemony (cf. Lehman & Tinker [1985],
Richardson [1987]); and
(h) those informed by the thinking of Derrida's deconstructionism (cf. Tinker &
Neimark [1987], Arington & Francis [1989], MacIntosh [1990]).
Although there exist dissimilarities amongst these diverse perspectives, a common
feature of authors of this movement is that they share a common feeling for accounting
research in that it needs to be considered within a broader societal context, and that the
development of theory needs to be considered open and refutable. Whereas mainstream
'positivists'2 rarely accept such an evaluation, that is the 'criticism(s) of their own
tradition' (Chua [1986, p.626]). Schutz ([1973, p.130]) refers to them (positivists) as an
unquestioned tradition. Gaffikin [1989] argues that research of the positivist's tradition is
commonly advanced as a 'paradigm knowledge-yielding enterprise'. It is sometimes
argued that research from the positivists' perspective is seeking answers only to the
research questions the researchers construct. In general, the performance of answers is
judged on the basis of the generality of theory from complex issues into a traceable
representation, and this is the basis of accolade and acceptance of a particular research
endeavour (Chowdhury [1986]).
The central theme of this paper is not to provide an exclusive coverage of the critiques of
'positivism' as that has been covered in several papers in the critical accounting literature
(cf. Lowe, Puxty and Laughlin [1983], Sterling [1990], Gaffikin [1987, 1988, 1989],
Hunt and Hogler [1988]). Rather, attention is drawn to the critical accounting movement
and its thrust towards understanding the problematic 'knowledge claim'. Researchers of
this (latter) movement have expressed their understanding and feeling (at least implicitly)
that accounting research needs to be considered within a broader societal context, and
theory development needs to be open and refutable. Although the details of each
individual perspective of the movement have so far not yet been discussed, it cannot be
assumed that they offer the same conclusions. It can be argued that these diversities have
created dysfunctions in the accounting research arena in that they result in incoherence
and diversity about the 'knowledge claim's,
Such consequences have created tensility among academics (researchers) some of whom
argue against the view that accounting research is a 'multi-parradigm' discipline (ct.
Cooper [1983], Hopper and Powell [1985] who followed Burrell and Morgan [1979]).
This argument has been favoured by Chua [1986] also. She argues that alluding to
accounting research as "multi-paradigm" or having "mutually-exclusive" perspectives
r
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creates a deficiency in accounting theorising. Instead, she argues, different "world
views" should be classified better "with reference to (the) underlying (philosophical)
assumptions about knowledge, the empirical phenomena under study, and the
relationship between theory and the practical world of human affairs" (p.603). By
developing such a classification of assumptions she divides 'mainstream accounting
thought' into groups with two alternate world-views, such as interpretive and critical.
With such an appreciation, she argues, a tradition of rich research insight would emerge.
A different view has been posited by Laughlin and Lowe [1990] who argue that "despite
the view of people like Giddens and Foucault, whose ideas have been adopted by some of
the new wave of accounting thinkers, who maintain that the opposites can be held in
dynamic balance making the choice unnecessary and counterproductive, we (Laughlin
and Lowe) would maintain that the key dimensions highlighted in the Burrell and
Morgan's framework are mutually exclusive, where choices are necessary in the
formulation of any approach to research into accounting systems design" (p.36). They
argue that the different perspectives (as listed above) are, somehow or other, well suited
to the three categories of Burrell and Morgan's [1979] classification of social theories
which excepted 'functionalist' paradigm. (For reference Burrell and Morgan's [1979]
representation of the four paradigms of social theory is reproduced in Figure - 1.)
Laughlin and Lowe further argue that critical accounting researchers have a common
understanding that field study in accounting is emergent and also recognise the need for
the rejection of the 'functionalist' paradigm.
Figure 1 (about here)
It is Laughlin and Lowe [1990] who claim that this choice of perspective is necessary but
they do not then clarify why it may be so. Therefore, in order to clarify further this
appreciation - that is, whether the 'choice of perspective is necessary or not' - the
following explanation is suggested: if it is assumed that the above perspectives (a-h) can
explain a particular phenomenon or object domain (x) with the same expected achievable
results then, logically, any choice is not necessary for it is expected that the same results
can be achieved irrespective of the perspective chosen. Thus, despite their theoretical
differences, it does not matter which perspective.is chosen. However, if it is assumed
that different 'truths' (say k-r) are respectively suitable for corresponding (a-h)
perspectives, then a 'choice is necessary'. Or, it can be argued that if any perspective can
explain better all the 'truths' or is suitable for explaining diverse 'truths' (accounting), one
may choose such a perspective (which is yet to be discovered in the accounting research
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arena!).
It is worth stressing what was suggested earlier, that neither accounting nor organisations
exist (in any significant manner) independently, that is, accounting exists for
organisations and organisations for accounting. Therefore, any ramifications of
accounting (social or political) must be considered in relation to organisations and any
meaningful ramifications can only be expanded if the organisational analysis of
accounting is a part of the primary research agenda.
A researcher wanting to embark on a study of an organisational analysis of accounting
may question the likely task for him/her before embarking on such an analysis? What
perspective should be adopted? Since organisational analysis is considered to be a major
part of the research agenda, an understanding of an organisational 'culture' would be
useful in enhancing understanding choice of perspective. Here, like Habermas (1987,
p.138) the meaning of 'culture' is taken to be: "the stock of knowledge from which
participants in communication supply themselves with interpretations as they come to an
understanding about something in the world". In the following section attention will be
drawn to how such an organisational 'culture' may evolve.
Organisational Culture & Transition Process
It can be argued that an organisational 'culture' (i.e. stock of knowledge) at a particular
point of time is an amalgam of both visible and invisible knowledge (as shown in Figure
- 2). How the 'invisible' can become a part of the stock of knowledge may be confusing
to some but is illustrated by the agenda which the management of organisation in
question always keeps for 'what is not', such as the future possibilities, hidden meanings
and unseen realities which are invisible to the organisational actor(s) at a particular point
of time. At the same time, in a dynamic, changing environment it is possible that what is
visible now may become invisible at some subsequent point of time (that is, either
existing systems become obsolete or more complex). Thus, the addition of 'what is not
now' (invisible knowledge) to 'what is now' (i.e, visible knowledge) makes the
organisational knowledge complete. In other words, an impetus for change in an
organisational context lies with the balancing of the 'visible' and 'invisible' sets of
knowledge. In addition, it can be argued that the management of the organisation in
question uses both sets of knowledge for the purposes of its system maintenance as well
as for its social integration.
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The dichotomies between the 'technical' and 'non-technical' classification is intentionally
avoided here, as it is often a debatable issue and difficult to isolate either classification in
any general sense without consideration of a specific context. Note also that the details
of organisational transformation processes in an input-output sense is eschewed (for such
a discussion see Otley and Berry [1980], Lowe and Machin [1983], Wilson & Chua
[1988]). In order to clarify the need for perspective choices for different 'truths'
(accounting) that may arise in an organisational analysis, a taxonomic classification of
visible and invisible in which both 'technical' and 'non-technical' are moulded
(embedded) is developed. At this stage, this classification is rather arbitrary as well as
speculative.
Figure 2 (about here).
The elements in the box of visible knowledge may be numerous. For simplicity, a
limited set of such knowledge is broadly categorised under the notion 'visible' such as
existing systems in use (i.e information in use), labour, work (purposive rational actions),
communicative knowledge (interaction - symbolic interaction and communicative
action), societal issues and history. Similarly, the invisible box can embrace numerous
unknown/unseen 'truths' which are often latent. The elements in this box include future
possibilities (new work possibilities), communicative knowledge (interaction - symbolic
interaction and communicative action), societal issues and history. From Figure-2, it is
apparent that at Time 1 in both boxes certain elements are common such as
communicative knowledge, societal issues and history. A reason for this is that at
particular point of time these 'truths' can never become totally transparent (Habermas
[1987]). They are, by nature, changing and developing through time.
Like societal issues and communicative knowledge, history is also considered as an
amalgam of both visible and invisible sets of knowledge. It is visible for there are some
existing histories about previous activities and relations as they are known now (which
can be seen as 'instrumentalistic' by nature at the time). It is invisible because there is a
need for constantly 'reworking', 'reinterpreting' (Birkett [1989]).
Through particular management practices, which. are shown in between the two time
dimensions of Figure-2 as transition processes, a utilization of a particular type of
change processes or design archetype or so via an interpretive scheme may take place (cf.
Laughlin [l990a]). It is through these processes that the organisational culture is
evolving. The nature of such a change in an organisational culture can be seen as
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'acontinuous' and 'aorganisational' (Boland [1990]). It is 'aorganisational' in that the
organisational participants (actors) always keep their work situation at their back as a
resource for action oriented to mutual understanding (Habermas [1987]). Generally, it is
the strategic management (or steering media) of an organisation which activates the
processes of transition known as management practices.
Two important suggestions can be made (hypotheses formulated) in order to focus on the
direction in which the organisational culture changes over time. First, as good practice
for the purpose of 'survival,' the steering media of the organisation may review their
existing visible knowledge base, that is, re-visiting 'what they know about themselves and
what they are doing'. In so doing, there may occur a change in existing systems or a
greater visibility of the nature of the existing knowledge base for those elements, such as
communicative knowledge, societal issues and history, which enhances the organisation's
adaptive capacity as, what Cooper [1881, 1983] sees as a tidying up process rather than
one which will muddle things. At the same time, it can be argued, that when the steering
media of an organisation wants to balance the existing systems or increase their adaptive
capacity in the uncertain environmental and societal complexities, it is possible that
instead of having more visibility some elements (say communicative knowledge) may
become more invisible (as shown by the line in Figure-2 ).
Secondly, at the same time, it can be argued that "not all unseens can be fully seen or
made visible or meaningfully understood at a particular point of time". Thus, there
emerges a continual necessity for more learning. It is through these learning processes
which the organisational culture (knowledge), recurrently evolving and rationalising
(rather temporarily), can be comprehended.
If these insights are correct, an important question can then arise as to how to deal with
the choice of perspective in an organisational analysis. It would seem that if a
researcher(s) wants to know only the 'visible knowledge' that the organisational actors
know at a particular point of time (say at Time 1 of Figure 2), he/she may need the
perspective that would facilitate explicating 'what they are now' (which, remember, is
'aorganisational' by nature); it is a question of knowing the organisational phenomena. In
so doing, it is to be noted that the researcher is riot an actor. This raises a question of
acting and knowing and this is seen as problematic by social scientists-, From the view
point of a researcher, something which is as yet to be uncovered is how such an
interpretation can be made possible; an interpretation which reflects a dependable
representation of what the organisation (the management) in question sees as the visible
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knowledge at hand at a particular point of time. It is also a question of whether such
knowledge is available in a written (Wilson & Chua [1988]) or any other form, at least,
for (say) communicative knowledge. Secondly, any attempt to comprehend, in order to
linguistify, the 'invisible set of knowledge' for a particular action, say communicative
action or so, may need a perspective which should facilitate explicating what that
knowledge is now not. It is important to bear in mind that such an explication cannot be
conducted in a value-free and neutral way. If done successfully it would certainly
enhance the predictive capacity of any real action situation. Thirdly, if we are to know
the transition processes of how change in an organisational setting has been occurring,
considering both visible and invisible knowledge, may need a formulation different from
other approaches. Finally (at least), any judgement regarding 'what is good practice' and
'what is bad practice' may take a different strand.
On the other hand, it cannot be assumed that accounting research can only be dealt with
within an organisational (micro) analysis. It may embrace some other area such as a
broader organisational analysis (i.e., industry analysis), an international comparison, or
political and social discourses. It may be that such a discourse based on critical
accounting research needs different formulations. Thus, if these possibilities (though not
exhaustive) arise, then, as mentioned earlier, a choice in formulating any approach to
research is necessary. Although this line of argument supports pluralism, as is argued by
Cooper and Hopper [1990], it seems to provide a workable premise for critical
accounting researchers (including students). In a respect these explanations appear
somewhat speculative and normative and seem to suggests that a researcher may venture
to start hislher major research by thinking along this line - until some commonality of
understanding is achieved.
It cannot be assumed that matching perspective(s) in the course of knowing and
linguistifying these (above) possibilities in an organisational setting can be achieved in
any definitive way. Much of this matching depends to a large extent on the researcher's
care in formulating the approach to the researching of such realities. It also depends on
several other aspects, such as gaining access to the organisation(s) and a deep
understanding of the context as well as on the researcher's ability to maintain such a
difficult role.
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From the above discussion, an argument can be made that the different scenarios (as
mentioned above), about determining a 'problematic knowledge claim' for different
possible realities, do not, in any sense, depend on a strict adherence to a methodology.
Rather, it is very much dependent on a wide variety of arguments and (better) silences, at
least, for interrelating the framework(s) and formulating the approach to research.
In the previous discussion attention has been drawn to a prescriptive understanding of
how organisational 'culture' and it's transition processes may (in a broad sense) evolve.
Some arguments in the form of questions, especially for the necessity of perspective
choices have been advanced. A reason for such a prescriptive focus is to clarify the
problematic 'knowledge claim' in understanding the uncertain relationships of the nature
of organisational 'culture' and it's transition processes. Merely understanding these
'cultural' processes does not necessarily mean that a change in accounting knowledge will
occur. Rather, it occurs when additions are made to existing theory or throughout the
development of a new theory.
Organisational Change and Change in a Discipline
Whether the concept of 'organisational change' can be considered parallel to that of
'change in a (pedagogic) discipline' that is to come is questionable. For example,
particular organisational knowledge (say change processes), which are unknown to a
researcher before any investigation takes place, cannot convey the total knowledge that
exists in the discipline in which the researcher is working (such as accounting). An
organisational analysis or analysis of any context provides a basis for substantiating the
existing knowledge of the discipline. Of ultimate concern, from a research point of view,
is the enhancement to the existing knowledge of the discipline by adding new insights
(research outcomes) from an unknown context. These new insights may bring new forms
of visibility, such as new meanings, new ways of doing things, generating new thinking,
etc., which will enhance change in context as well as filling in the gap between the theory
and practice. Increasing 'linguistification' (Habermas [1984, 1987]) of the varieties
(multiplicities) from contexts and filtering them through writing history may be a
possible way of changing a discipline or a way of thinking about the discipline, say
accountings.
From the view point of a 'research student perspective' an important point is that a
researcher (the student) cannot start his/her work in a vacuum. Thus, before choosing a
perspective or perspectives, the researcher (research student perspective) needs to bring
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the history (of existing theories and thought) of the discipline with special reference to
the wing (particular ann of the discipline) and its sub-branches in order to focus his/her
research interests. In other words, this is what Gaffikin [1984] argues when he says that
"any successful theory must be able to count for past research/theoretical activity within
that discipline" (p.8). It follows that in order to enhance the knowledge of the existing
(management) accounting thought and theories, a field study needs to be undertaken. In
order to substantiate the empirical ground the related existing theories and thought need
to be evaluated, a research interest needs to be addressed and a perspective (or
perspectives) needs to be chosen. (Of course, it is not an easy task to resolve, at least at
this stage, which perspective one should choose, as, for the beginner, it seems to be
somewhat arbitrary!).
In accounting there exits 'two dominant wings', which have achieved attention in the
development of theory - financial accounting and management accounting. Within these
wings there exists some other sub-branches. Although sections overlap in practice,
without an understanding of the boundary connotation between these two major wings, it
may be that a field study in accounting would be unmanageable. This suggests that in
reality every researcher needs a workable definition or (at least) connotation of the wing
or sub-branches in which to conduct field studies. But it is important to remember that in
the social sciences (say accounting) it is worth looking for connotative meaning rather
than a general meaning. Thus, to some, there may be confusion about the possibility of
subjects overlapping: some subjects that may appear to more correctly belong in other
sub-branches of the discipline. It seems that this long debate can only be overcome if the
researcher(s) reflects on this issue while undertaking the field study.
It is stressed that this propaedeutic paper does not intended to draw a historical review of
the evolution of the existing theories and thought (of a wing or discipline) for a specific
research project. But, it proclaims that it provides a framework for a 'research student
perspective' in that the researcher (the student) needs to address the existing thoughts and
theories in order to overcome any limitations in the conventional. However, an example
of how such an evaluation can be made possible in order to focus on the perspective(s)
choices, at least initially for a framework, is given below.
An Example: The consideration of the notion of 'rationality' in theorizing accounting
effects on economic and social life is a recent phenomenon. Although it has a long
retrospection in the German tradition of critical social theory (cf. Max Weber [1958],
Marcuse [1978], Habermas [1971, 1974, 1978, 1984, 1987, 1987b]), it has only very
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recently appeared in accounting research. Such an eclecticism has helped accounting
researchers to question the conventional wisdom and theories of their discipline. For
example, a realisation has occurred concerning the manner in which in traditional
accounting research the question of 'rationality' is one-sided, where "society is seen as
being comprised of independent, freely contracting individuals, whose initial
endowments are irrelevant to the contracted outcomes, and conflict is viewed
individualistically, asocially and as an equilibrating process" (Neimark and Tinker [1986,
p.369]) has been dealt with. Such a traditional view has ignored the social and historical
origins of the structural relations and institutional forms of human society that
characterize contemporary capitalism (Neimark and Tinker [1986]). In other words, it
ignores the socio-historical perspective.
In response to the limitations of traditional thinking some accounting researchers have
called for a more self-reflexive and contextualised accounting literature (as mentioned
earlier), which recognizes the interrelationships between society, accounting theory and
practice, and incorporates inter-organizational and social conflict (cf. Hopwood [1979,
1983, 1986]; Tinker [1980, 1975]; Hoogvelt & Tinker, [1978]; Burchell et al., [1980];
Cooper & Sherer, [1984], Neimark & Tinker [1986], Laughlin [1987,1988], Tinker and
Lowe [1984], Cooper & Hopper [1987], Broadbent et al. [1990]).
Neimark and Tinker [1986] explain how the traditional accounting theories have
undermined the potentiality of incorporating the socio-historic elements that need much
attention for explaining occidental modernisation. Though they base their analysis on
Marx's account of modernisation, it would have strengthened their analysis if they had
considered Habennas' natural extension of Marx's account in understanding 'modernity'.
However, their strong criticism of orthodox (traditional) research can be taken as a basis
for further understanding how accounting sociality can be related and expanded. In fact,
their (eg. Neimark and Tinker [1986]) discussion were centred on uncovering the
limitations of the conventional models of management control systems (MCS) over the
social construction of MCS, where management accounting systems (MAS) are parts of
the former.
They identify six major limitations of the traditional theories (such as transaction cost
theories, contingency theories, agency theories and the inducement contribution model)
that dealt with elaborating 'management control systems'. The limitations, they (Neimark
and Tinker [1986]) put forward, are: (i) it does not consider the socio-historical
perspective; (ii) it frequently ignores socially deserving processes of feedback
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mechanisms; (iii) "it fails to acknowledge the extent to which the organization is part of
and constitutes its environment, as well as the extent to which the environment permeates
the organisation's internal structure and social relations". In other words, "it views the
organisation and its environment as separate entities"; (iv) the environment is
incompletely articulated, such as (a) individuals are viewed as atomistic beings not
belonging to a structure of social relations, that is, of part of the wider society, (b) social
conflict is seen as an equilibrating process that takes the form of market competition, (c)
neglects the possibility of fair exchanges which may have inevitable features, (d) the
reliance on marginalist economics; (v) it undermines the performance as non-
problematic - implicitly it assumes "what is good for the capitalist is good for the worker,
the local community and nation", and they thereby ignore the social costs imposed on
society by corporate innovations; (vi) finally, the orthodox model is grounded in a
"positivistic epistemology which itself understated the social status of their theories" (pp.
370-77).
To Habermas, any theory that claims to be a theory of society (in sociological sense) will
encounter the problem of employing a concept of rationality, which always has a
normative content at three levels (Haberrnas [1984]). These levels, Haberrnas [1984]
argues, "can avoid neither the metatheoretical question concerning the rationality
implications of its (sociology) guiding concepts of action nor the methodological
question concerning the rationality implications of gaining access to its object domain
through an understanding of meaning; nor, finally, can it avoid the empirical-theoretical
question concerning the sense, if any, in which the modernisation of societies can be
described as rationalization" (p .x1). Accounting is no different.
From this viewpoint, at least theoretically, Haberrnas has extended our understanding that
'neither everything is good nor can it be discarded'. Using Haberrnas's critical approach
some accounting researchers (cf. Laughlin [1984, 1987, 1988, 1990a], Broadbent et.al.
[1990], Chua and Degeling [1990]) have reflected its potentiality both in methodological
and theoretical developments towards the organisational analysis of accounting and the
analysis of societal developments. It is true that Haberrnas has advanced his thesis
through a consideration of diverse range of issues. However, to enter into the debate of
how a Haberrnasian critical thought is relevant to understand our accounting and a future
research project, the following two sections are directed to this end. In the first section, it
is intended to focus on some aspects of Haberrnas's main thesis regarding the explanation
of 'communicative action', 'rationality' and 'modernity', as much of the recent debate
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amongst the contemporary sociologists is centred on this issue. In the second section,
attention is drawn to Habennas's thesis of the relations between systems and lifeworld
and its interrelationships.
1. Some Aspects of Habermas's Critical Approach in Understanding Modernity and
Likely Accounting Intervention
A central theme in Habennas's work is the thesis that a societal development, be it from
either a broad societal or a micro organisational viewpoint, is traceable to the increasing
linguistic skills of the societal participants. It is through developing these discursive
skills, Habennas maintains, that "society has progressed from the mythical through to the
modern". The process of increasing such a skill, according to Habennas, has an
evolutionary effect. That is, it is through the evolutionary process that any action can be
either implemented or understood in an organisational as well as in societal context, but
not with the strong (objective/panoptic view) metaphorical understanding of, what
Habennas calls, 'scientism'.
Another appreciation of Habennas's thesis lies in the theme that his theory of
communicative action is not a metatheory, but rather what he sees as "the beginning of a
social theory that is concerned to validate its own standards". Habennas accomplishes
this by shifting his attention to the paradigm of language, that is, not as a 'syntactic' or
'semantic' analysis, but as 'language-in-use or speech'. This latter concept, that is -
language-in-use or speech, according to Habennas, can be used for 'comprehensibility',
'truth', 'rightness', and 'sincerity' rather than as a tool for creating universal validity
claims.
In particular, Habennas develops these concepts in his two volume work The Theory of
Communicative Action (as translated by T. McCarthy in 1984 and 1987 respectively).
The titles are indicative of the focus of each volume; the first is subtitled The Reason and
Rationalisation ofSociety, the second, System and Lifeworld: A Critique ofFunctionalist
Reason.
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Throughout these volumes, one of Habennas's principal preoccupations is seen in the
form of a question, namely, "whether and in what respects modernisation of western
capitalism can be viewed as rationalization?". Assessment of 'modernity' is one of the
pivotal considerations that has been central in much of Habermas's recent work. For him,
"the real challenge lies in conceptualizing 'modernity' in a way which neither overlaps its
costs, nor uncritically celebrates it in the way that mainstream social science has
advanced" (White [1990, p.91]). (Habermas's humanist thinking, in the terminology of
Burrell and Morgan [1979], is a call for a 'just and free life' - a far reaching goal). This
viewpoint has dominated concept and theory formation not only in modem sociology but
also in the related fields of social sciences including the critical accounting literature.
Through sustaining a continuous line of thought Habennas demonstrates, in the above
volumes, three interrelated concerns which he considers theoretical reconstructions over
the ideas of 'classical' social theorists (Eg. Marx, Max Weber, Durkheim, Mead, Lukacs,
Horkeimer, Adorno, and Talcott Parsons) on the subject of communicative action and
'modernity'. These concerns are neatly summarised by T.McCarthy as:
(1) to develop a concept of rationality that is no longer tied to, and limited
by, the subjectivistic and individualistic premises of modem
philosophy and social theory;
(2) to develop two-level concept of society that integrates the lifeworld
and system paradigms; and,
(3) to sketch out, against this background, a critical theory of modernity
which analyzes and accounts for its pathologies in a way that suggests
a redirection rather than an abandonment of the project of
enlightenment.[1984, p.vi]
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Habennas argues that "the notion of lifeworld [lebenswelt] must be introduced in order to
link action theory more convincingly with rationalization processes. This means
understanding not just how particular actions might be judged as rational, but how the
rationality potential made available in modem culture is 'fed into' particular actions
making possible a 'rational conduct of life' in general". He thinks the introduction of this
idea of the 'lifeworld' was necessary as it is a complement of the concept of
'communicative action'. According to Habennas, "it (lifeworld) links that concept firmly
to the concept of society; and by directing attention to the 'context-forming horizon' of
social action, it takes (us) another step away from the subjectivistic biases of modem
social theory. Moreover, it makes it possible to construe rationalization primarily as a
transformation of implicitly known, taken-for-granted structures of the lifeworld rather
than of explicitly known, conscious orientations of action" (McCarthy, [1984]).
Habennas further argues that "the object domain of social inquiry is symbolically
prestructured, antecedently constituted by the interpretive activities of its members, the
social scientists can gain access to social objects only via interpretive understanding
(Sinnverstehen) - be these 'objects' social action themselves, their sedimentations in texts,
traditions, cultural artifacts and the like, or such organized configurations as institutions,
systems, and structures".
The process of coming to an understanding in specific situations, must take place against
the horizon of a lifeworld. Habennas maintains, it is from the viewpoint of
understanding-oriented action that the lifeworld "stores the interpretive work of
preceding generations" and, thus, functions as a "conservative counterweight to the risk
of disagreement that arises with every actual process of reaching an understanding". In
fact, borrowing from phenomenological studies, Habermas draws attention to a
culturalistic concept of 'lifeworld'. He argues that it is the cultural patterns of
interpretation, evaluation, and expression that serve as resources for the achievement of
mutual understanding by participants who wants to negotiate a common definition of a
situation to arrive at a consensus regarding something in the world. Such an interpreted
action situation, Habermas [1987] argues, circumscribes "a thematically opened up range
of action alternatives, that is, of conditions and means for carrying out plans. Everything
that appears as a restriction on corresponding action initiatives belongs to the situation"
(p.134).
It is the actor, according to Habennas, who always keeps the lifeworld at his back as a
resource for action oriented to mutual understanding. Any restrictions (problems/
r
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resistance) that circumstances place on the pursuit of an actor's plans also appears to the
actor as elements of the situation. Such a view of cultural patterns of interpretation,
evaluation and expression of action situation, Habermas maintains, does not fall under
formal world-concepts, that is, by means of which participants come to an understanding
about their situation. If the actors cannot grasp the action situation from the cultural
patterns and language, it is then in need of the "repair work of translators, interpreters,
and therapists" (as Habermas calls it). That is, where their research endeavours emerge.
Habermas spent quite some time and energy and devoted space in his early writings,
especially in Theory and Practice (see Habermas [1974, pp.1-41]; see also the discussion
in Held [1980], Thompson [1981], Geuss [1981] and Roderick [1986]) to describing how
such endeavours can be accomplished. It is through his 'discursive processes', which is
broadly defmed as the 'ideal speech situation' (see Laughlin [1987] for a summary of
these processes), that both the researcher and researched (actors) are lifted out the
problematic situation and are headed towards gaining 'consensus' and then, selection for
implementation. However, Habermas's discursive framework is not problem free in
respect of its practicalities, such as 'gaining access' (for more see Laughlin [1987]).
(Thus, it may be necessary to tum to this issue again when determining its potentiality for
a project while undertaking the practical level of analysis.)
Within Habermas's theoretical framework, the question of symbolic reproduction is the
same as the question of how the lifeworld is reproduced. That is, of how communicative
action generates on-going patterns of social relations and the integration of individuals
into them. This becomes interesting as a principle of "sociation". That is, after removing
the problems each agent's own critical capacities are increasingly integrated into the on-
going reproduction of the lifeworld. Accommodation of a new experience to the stock of
"the unproblematic" creates a new dimension, or what Habermas called the "second
order" rationalisation. Thus, he introduced the new concept of 'rationalised lifeworld'
rather then simply the 'lifeworld'. Habermas's main argument in developing such a
concept of rationality is to give more attention to the experience of achieving mutual
understanding that is free from coercion. If this is carried through at a reflective level,
Habermas believes, it will open up the ground to gain intersubjective recognition for
criticizable validity claims, which will ultimately help in identifying and correcting
mistakes, that is, of learning from them. That is, by reflecting the reason to act rationally,
it can ultimately constitute a domain of 'self-reflective' or 'critical knowledge'
(Bottomore, [1984, p.57]. A result, according to Habermas, Held [1980, p.255]) argues,
will be the enhancement of autonomy. Thus, Habermas [1987b, p.1l7] argues that man
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(sic), 'for if he is indeed an autonomous and fully responsible being', 'cannot escape the
conclusion that he is the author of crimes, and he, then, can distinguish between
'transcendental man' and 'empirical man'. In this way, Habermas thinks, of how to create
a "second order" dimension of societal developments including micro-organizational
change.
After examining a wide range of the organisational change literature, Laughlin [1990a]
has further examined how Habermas's framework fits into the theoretical development of
organizational change. The basic premises of such discursive argumentation, according
to Laughlin, requires a conceptualization of an organisation as "an amalgam of
'interpretive schemes', 'design archetypes' and 'sub-systems'" [1990a]. He argues that "..
. organisations contain certain tangible elements about which intersubjective agreement is
possible (e.g. the phenomena that call for instance buildings, workers, machines, finance
and accounting systems and the behaviour and nature of these elements) and two less
tangible dimensions which gives direction, meaning, significance, nature and
interconnection to these more visible elements and about which intersubjective
agreement is very difficult. This less tangible part .... (has two progressive) invisible
parts: a design archetype and interpretive schemes" (pp.4-5).6
It is this 'less tangible' (i.e., what Habermas called transcendental reality) part of the
'designing' literature, be it accounting systems design or any other systems design, that is
problematical (difficult to grasp). For the tangible part it is a matter of 'making things
visible' (Swieringa and Weick [1987], Hopwood [1990]), such as including identification
of costs and timely collection of information (Kaplan [1984], Johnson and Kaplan
[1987]), and (even) 'initiating and sustaining a forceful (purposive rational) action' (cf.
Swieringa and Weick [1987]). On the other hand, this is not to suggest that this (tangible
part) would not 'loom large' (cf. Hopper, MacIntosh and N.V. School [1990, p.5]). It is
important to realise that these (parts) are context dependent. Habermas maintains that
they (and understanding them) do (does) not fall under the formal world-concepts (as
mentioned earlier). But, for the 'less tangible parts', it is the participants who come to an
understanding of their action situation through the cultural patterns of interpretation,
evaluation and expression. Understanding these cultural patterns may have greater
potentiality in understanding the 'change' processes at both the micro-organisational and
societal levels.
According to Laughlin [1990a], "(the) organisational change (at micro-level) can only be
understood by tracing the process, track or pathway a disturbance/kick/jolt (that) takes
r
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through an organisation". With this in mind, after examinmg the organisational
development (OD) theories, Laughlin [1990a] put forward four pathways as alternative
processual models of organisational 'transition' and 'transformation' - 'rebuttal',
'reorientation', 'colonisation', and 'evolution'. Laughlin argues that the former two
categories are 'first order changes' and the latter two are 'second order changes'. He
suggests that this dichotomy between 'first order' and 'second order' change is aligned
with Habennas's thought. Thus, he put forward an argument that "the above three
models or pathways (e.g. 'rebuttal', 'reorientation' and 'colonisation') of change can be
seen as progressive forms of colonisation in a Habennasian sense (Laughlin [1990a]).
Change of a 'rebuttal' nature is clearly a weak form of colonisation since it is of a first
order (morphostatic) nature and makes little impression on the life of the organisation.
Change of a 'reorientation' nature is a stronger form of colonisation as it involves
changing the organisation even if it is in a first order (morphostatic) sense. As with
'rebuttal' type changes 'reorientation' change is steered and guided by the interpretive
schemes of the organisation even though there is greater intrusion into the intemallife of
the organisation. Change of a 'colonisation' nature, on the other hand, is a complete form
of colonisation being a second order (morphogenetic) change forced upon the
organisation but in an autopioetic sense." (p.21)
The final type of change elaborated by Laughlin [1990a] is that of change through
'evolution'. Such a change involves, major shifts in the interpretive schema. That is, the
organisational participants freely and without coercion choose it to have occurred
through a discursive process between themselves (actors). Similarly, in a case of a broad
societal development such a change is traceable, according to Habermas, to the
increasing linguistic skills of the societal participants. In other words, to Habennas this
appreciation has an evolutionary effect; what Laughlin [1990a] and others (cf. Smith
[1982]) have denoted as the change of 'evolution'.
As mentioned earlier, Habermas has advanced his thesis through a consideration of a
diverse range of issues. However, it is not intended to summarise his thesis or do justice
to all of his thought in this paper. In any case, we are interested to see the potentiality of
his framework in order to reflect a micro-organizational (including the less visible)
understanding (as shown in figure 2). This, of' course, does not divert us from the
consideration of a Habermasian approach for other possibilities such as accounting based
political and social discourses.
Habennas maintains an epistemological totality, so that it does not overlap the thoughts
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of his predecessors. This brings Habennas's attention back to previous social theorists
including George Habert Mead who advanced the conceptual genesis of 'self and society'
as an individualistic model of social action. He did not totally reject the account of Mead
but rather put forward an argument against him - that "individuation processes are
simultaneously socialization processes (and conversely), that motivations and repertoires
of behaviour are symbolically restructured in the course of identity formation, that
individual intentions and interests, desires and feelings are not essentially private but tied
to language and culture and thus inherently susceptible of interpretation, discussion and
change" (McCarthy [1984, p.xx]). Thus, Habennas goes on to argue that Mead's account
does not give adequate consideration to the external factors that may influence the actual
course of action; Mead does not give the functional aspects play equal to the structural
aspects; he (Mead) generally neglects the constraints that issue from the material
reproduction of society and reach right into the action orientations of sociated
individuals.
According to Habennas, "individuals cannot 'step out' from their lifeworlds nor can they
objectify them in a supreme act of reflection". It is "in the form of 'language' and 'culture'
that this reservoir (culturally transmitted and linguistically organised stock of interpretive
patterns) of implicit knowledge supplies actors with unproblematic background
convictions upon which they draw in the negotiation of common definitions of situations"
(McCarthy [1984, p.xxiv]). Consider an example of a section/unit manager of a large
decentralised organisation. Hypothetically, can we give pragmatic answers to such a
question as to how this individual performs his/her tasks? In other words, how he/she
sociates with others in order to perform his/her tasks? Is he/she gaining control over his
task by enforcing (introducing) 'loss of meaning' or 'loss of freedom'? This certainly
raises an empirical question.
To develop a more adequate framework Habennas returns to the communicative practice
of everyday life, the medium of symbolic representation. Habennas [1987] argues, "(i)n
coming to an understanding with one another about their situation, participants in
communication stand in a cultural tradition which they use and at the same time renew;
in coordinating their actions via intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims,
they rely on memberships in social groups and at the same time reinforce the integration
of the latter; through participating in interaction with competent reference persons,
growing children internalize the value orientations of their social groups and acquire
generalized capabilities for action . . . Under the functional aspect of reaching
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understanding communicative action serves the transmission and renewal of cultural
knowledge; under the aspects of coordinating action, it serves social integration and the
establishment of group solidarity; under the aspect of socialization, it serves the
formation of personal identities." [p.208]
This is a reason why Habermas sees that "to the different structural components of the
lifeworld (culture, society, personality) there correspond reproduction processes (cultural
reproduction, social integration, socialization) based on different aspects of
communicative action (understanding, coordination, sociation), which are rooted in
structural components speech acts (propositional, illocutionary, expressive)" (White
[1990]). These structural correspondences permit communicative action to perform its
different functions and to serve as a suitable medium for the symbolic reproduction of the
life world. When these functions are interfered with, according to Habermas, there arise
disturbances in the reproduction process and corresponding crisis manifestations - such as
"loss of meaning, withdrawal of legitimation, confusion of orientations, anomie,
destablization of collective identities, alienation, psychopathologies, breakdown in
tradition, withdrawal of motivation".
The key to Habermas's theoretical reconstruction of his predecessors theories is the
distinction between lifeworld and system, which he presents as a distinction between two
fundamentally different ways of approaching the study of society. Conversely, he also
tries to integrate this two-level concept of society in order to gain a complete
understanding about modernization. Thus, he argues that the existing approaches are
typically "selective" and "one-sided".
Different thinkers have focused on the 'lifeworld' as a cultural storehouse, or as a source
of expectations about the ordering of social relations, or as a milieu out of which
individual competences for speech and action are formed. Habermas, on the other hand,
wants to emphasize the fact that part of what constitutes a rationalized lifeworld is its
"structural differentiation" of precisely these three dimensions: culture, society and
personality. To Habermas, culture means "the stock of knowledge from which
participants in communication supply themselves with interpretations as they come to an
understanding about something in the world". He uses the term society to mean "the
legitimate orders through which participants regulate their membership in social groups
and thereby secure solidarity". By personality he understands "the competences that
make a subject capable of speaking and acting, that put him in a position to take part in a
process of reaching understanding and thereby to assert his own identity" [1987, p.138].
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It is worth mentioning that the existence of Habermas's notion of a rationalized lifeworld,
as argued by White [1990, p.102], does not mean that all communicative action will
make equal use of its potential (see for example Colignon and Covaleski [1988] - for
purposive rational communicative action).
Habermas seeks to develop a multidimensional concept of lifeworld through which, he
believes, the lifeworld is symbolically reproduced. If his argument is correct the
hypothetico-deductive (H-D) method cannot reflect such a complex (strategically
oriented) reality. How such reproductive processes are reified in the case of a locale (at
the micro organisational level) is an interesting proposition worthy of a future research
project.
A more debatable question can arise from the conjunction of the idea of the lifeworld
with that of a rationalisation process. It is a crucial question; according to Habermas, it
refers to the system of validity claims about the formal structure of the lifeworld which is
of increasing concern at the conscious disposal of modern subjects (humankind).
Habermas is not blind to this. This may be the reason why White [1990, p.103] sees that
Habermas's account of viewing lifeworld phenomena possesses characteristics which fall
into a 'weak' category, rather a 'strong' view (which traces its roots to Gadamer and
Heidegger) as far as methodology is concerned. For Habermas the lifeworld is never
rendered totally transparent. Rather, it is 'co-given' in the flow of experience as a certain,
familiar ground of every situationally determined interpretation. Thus, according to
Habermas, it becomes a learning process, that is associated with modernity, that allows
for the reproduction of the lifeworld in a more conscious way and becomes constitutive
and enabling though it has limits in its "weak" sense. This has a further alignment from
Laughlin [1990b] who suggests Habermas's account is of 'middle range thinking', neither
'weak' nor 'strong'.
Habermas draws new insights into the rationalisation processes by going back to Max
Weber, Durkheim, Mead, Marx, Talcott Parsons. He has done this by evaluating the
concepts of 'division of labour', 'individuation' theory, theory of value, action and system
theory of the latter. Habermas argues that consideration of either of these concepts
individually would lead to a one-sided analysis of modernity. This one-sidedness does
not conceptualize such a dilemma, according to Habermas, that is, the 'loss of meaning'
and the 'loss of freedom'; which has the counterfactual possibilities for organising social
action differently. In order to open up the conceptual space for such lines of thought
"one has to make two major theoretical shifts. On the one hand, the theory of
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communicative action has to be integrated with an account of the lifeworld; and, on the
other, the action-theoretical frame of analysis has to be supplemented with a systems-
theoretical frame" (White [1990, p.97]).
Habermas does this by advancing a two-stage theory of society. In so doing, Habermas
advances new insights into how the 'pathologies' of a rationalized society can be
adequately illuminated. With the analysis of these 'pathologies', Habermas maintains, it
is possible to see the syndromes of including the "colonization of the lifeworld" and
"cultural impoverishment" in contemporary capitalist society. At this stage, we are not
sure about how such an analysis could be conducted although Habermas has advanced a
'practical hypothesis'. As a first step towards reinterpreting the syndromes of structural
differentiation or tracing the pathway of change processes (as Laughlin [1990a] suggests)
one may carry the analysis of the 'sacred' and this might ultimately generate constraints
on the rationaization of action. This will, then, lead to reify Habermas's hypothesis that
"linguistifIcation of the sacred facilitates rationalization process of the 'lifeworld"'.
According to Habermas, social integration presents itself as part of the symbolic
reproduction of the lifeworld which depends not only on the reproduction of membership
(or solidarities) but also on cultural traditions and socialization processes. In contrast,
functional integration amounts to a material reproduction of the lifeworld that can be
conceived as system maintenance. Habermas argues that the transition from one problem
area to another is tied to a change of methodological attitude and the conceptual
apparatus. As a result of his long demonstration, especially in respect of his theory of
communicative action, it seems possible to intuitively outline the methodology that
Habermas is suggesting but when it comes to pin-pointing any micro aspects it becomes
difficult, though not impossible, to abstract its thrust. So it may be this reason that
Habermas's framework, despite his being a researcher of the highest level, is still
considered as unpractical on the pragmatic/empirical level - 'much has to be thought
through' [Broadbent et al, 1990].
Some accounting researchers (cf. Boland and Pondy [1983, 1986], Hopwood [1983],
Covaleski, Dirsmith and Jablonsky [1985], Covaleski and Dirsmith [1986, 1988]) have
concentrated on demonstrating that accounting plays an important role in the 'symbolic
reproduction process', be it in organisational or societal aspects. In addition, accounting
is also viewed as an 'instrument' through which a mapping task of material reproduction
is fulfilled, as for example through the formulation of budgets and the institutionalisation
of rules. But it is Marx who was struggling with the problem of how to understand the
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interconnection between the processes of material and their symbolic reproduction.
Habermas, like Marx, is especially interested in the impact of the imperatives of material
reproduction on everyday life as well as the role ideology plays in how these imperatives
are understood (White, [1990]). Thus, in order to grasp the systemic structure of modem
life, Habermas suggests, it is necessary to consider not only the 'critic of instrumental
reason', but also the 'critique of functionalistic reason'. This can be achieved only when a
system perspective is integrated with a communicative model of action. From the
resulting viewpoint, White argues, "the key notion of reification can then be
reinterpreted as 'deformation of lifeworld' which are 'systemically induced'" [1990,
p.104].
"When Habermas speaks of functionalist reason, he is speaking of rationality as
conceptualized within systems theory. A system becomes more rational as its complexity
increases; that is, as its range of adaptation to environmental changes is enhanced"
[White, 1990, p,104]. Although the same line of thought has been advanced in
contemporary contingency theory of management accounting, at least theoretically,
theorists have so far only adapted the H-D method ('positivistic' method of cause-effect
calculation) for empirical investigation and are restricted by its limitations, as mentioned
earlier (cf. Neimark and Tinker [1986, pp. 370-77]). It is also argued that relationships
so far found from adaptation of the H-D method are shown to be 'weak' and the
conclusions are fragmentary (Dent [1990, Otley [1989]). Questions such as what is to be
adapted and how it is to be adapted, only provided some panoptic generalizations which
are empirically unacceptable. The methodological restrictions of such a method (H-D
method) of testing theory undermines the processes by which a 'rationalized lifeworld'
[(organizational) culture, society, and personality] is symbolically reproduced. 7
In the differentiated structures of a rationalized lifeworld, Habermas sees that the actions
increasingly need be coordinated by consensual agreement (say including 'management
by exception' or 'participatory budgeting' at the inter-organisational systems level) rather
than by normative prescriptions only. With this progressive shift in the way actions are
sociated there is, however, according to Habermas, a corresponding increase in the
potential for 'dissensus' and 'instability'. Habermas was not blind about the modem
structure of consciousness in that he recognizes the objectivating attitude of the modem
subjects towards both the social as well as the natural world. Thus, he certainly realises
that such an objectivating (strategic) orientation, which has links with money and power,
makes the action coordination either increasingly cut off or 'uncoupled' from 'lifeworld
r
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context' ( where the processes of understanding are always embedded). For example,
"the extensive use of short-term financial calculations to appraise managerial
performance is deemed to have directed managerial attention away from fundamental
value-creating activities, motivating instead opportunistic behaviours will (have) less
pennanent benefits, both in market place and in corporate finance offices" (Dent [1990,
p.3]). Such a 'colonisation' in organisational practices may lead to more and more social
consequences in the long run (such as including corporate failures). Thus, Habermas
[1987] sees that "the emergence of a rationalized lifeworld not only sets free the
'rationality potential of communicative action', but it is also a necessary condition for a
new level of system differentiation, characterized by the development of a capitalist
economy and modem form of administration" [p.341].
Here, the crucial question again is that of how to grasp the integration of both the
material and the symbolic reproduction in an organisational context. Habermas
suggested one solutions would be to incorporate the 'intemalists' and the 'extemalists'
points of view, that is, broadening the internal perspective to incorporate an observer's
external point of view [White, 1990]. This shift of methodological attitude, at least,
according to Habermas, will limit the objectivating attitude on the Iifeworld.f
Although it seems a difficult task to follow through the identification of the processual
change in an empirical setting, as a rule of thumb, it is possible to proceed with
Habermas's 'middle range thinking' for a descriptive understanding of the subject matter
under consideration. A reason of such an appreciation is that, according to Habermas,
"the lifeworld can never be fully transparent" for such orientations; rather, it is a learning
process. It may be a reason why Broadbent et al.[1990] argue that 'Habennas does only
provide the framework', from which they have developed a 'balance' model for discussing
the fmancial and administrative changes in the National Health Services (NHS) of the
UK. More recently Chua and Degeling [1990] employ Habennas's framework in a case
analysis of the US health care industry.
The above mentioned research efforts have demonstrated that Habennas's framework
provides some guide in thinking, theorising, and investigating accounting as a social
phenomena. Yet, not enough has been done and much more work is needed in order to
substantiate Habermas's framework in an empirical setting. This is the motivation for a
proposed study - to undertake a research project on a locale with especial attention to
substantiating Habermas's great thinking on modernity. A primary focus of the project
will on the question of how the proposed organisation (locale), say a large organization,
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has been integrating their'lifeworld' and 'systems', at least to reflect the interface between
the (strategic) change and accounting related areas. An understanding of them will
enable reflection on the accounting/economic implications of the development of a
critical theory. 9
2. Relations Between Systems and Lifeworld, and Their Interrelationship.
In an attempt to uncover the deficiency of Mead's account of 'individuation' theory
Habermas, first drew attention to Durkheim's account of how the forms of social
solidarity change with the division of labour and then, secondly, to Talcott Parsons'
theory of social system. In drawing attention to Durkheim's consideration of the
"division of labour" (which also has a link with Max Weberl"), Habermas provides an
explanation of how the growing "division of labour" is connected with the changing
forms of social solidarity and why it leads, in the modem period, to symptoms of social
disintegration. Taking this as a point of departure, McCarthy [1984] argues that
"Habermas seeks to reconstruct a Marxist approach that traces pathological forms of
symbolic reproduction not to the rationalization of the lifeworld itself but to constraints
issuing from processes of material reproduction" (p.xxvi). For example, Habermas
[1987] argues that the "system and lifeworld appear in Marx under the metaphors of the
realm of necessity and realm of freedom (emphasis added). The socialist is to free the
latter from the dictates of the former. It seems as if theoretical critique has only to lift the
spell cast by abstract labour (subsumed under the commodity form), The
intersubjectivity of workers associated in large industries is crippled under the self-
movement of capital; theoretical critique has only to free it of its stiffness for an avant-
garde (pioneers) to mobilize living - critically enlivened - labour against dead labour and
to lead it to the triumph of the lifeword over the system of deworlded labour power."
[p.340].
Thus, Habermas [1987] argues that "Marx's error stems in the end from dialectically
clamping together system and lifeworld in a way that does not allow for a sufficiently
sharp separation between the level of system differentiation attained in the modem period
and the class-specific forms in which it has been institutionalized. Marx did not
withstand the temptations of Hegelian totality-thinking; he construed the unity of system
and lifeworld dialectically as an 'untrue whole'. Otherwise he could not have failed to see
that every modem society, whatever its class structure, has to exhibit a high degree of
structural differentiation" [p.341]. This is a reason why Habermas [1987] sees that Marx
is unable to distinguish the repressive uprooting of the traditional forms of life between
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the aspect of reification and that of structural differentiation of the lifeworld. The theory
of value, according to Habennas, "provides no basis for a concept of reification, enabling
us to identify syndromes of alienation relative to the degree of rationalization attained in
a 'lifeworld'". Habermas further maintains that "at this stage of post-traditional forms of
life, the pain that the separation of culture, society, and personality also causes those who
grow into the modem societies and form their identities within them counts as a process
of individuation and not alienation" [pp.341-42]. This leads him to argue that "(i)n an
extensively rationalized lifeworld, reification (materialization) can be measured only
against the conditions of communicative sociation, and not against the nostalgically
loaded, frequently romanticized past of premodern forms of life" [p.342].
Habermas [1987, p.340] advances three potential weaknesses in Marx's theory of value,
such as, first, Marx's classification of system and lifeworld lies under 'the metaphors of
the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom'. Secondly, Marx was unable to
distinguish between the aspects of reification of traditional forms of life and that of
structural differentiation of the lifeworld. Thirdly, the theory of value is seen as an
overgeneralization of the case of the subsumption of the lifeworld as system. This
suggests that Marx's theory of value allows for only one channel through which the
monetarization of labour power expropriates from producers work activities into
performances. Although Marx was unable to produce a satisfactory account of late
capitalism, Habermas [1987, p.343] argues Marx was right to assign an evolutionary
primacy to the economy in western societies.
Returning to Marx, who has analysed 'economic reification' processes based only on class
conflict as the basic causal factor, Habermas, according to White [1990, p.108], sees that
the 'decisive weakness' inthe former theory is the "overgeneralisation of a special case of
the subsumption of the lifeworld under system imperatives". Habermas maintains, that
"although the cause of reification may arise in the sphere of labour and capital, the
process of reification and its effects is (may) also (be) experienced in other spheres of
life" [p.108]. This expanded field of action of Habermas's reification process of systemic
integration, (White's [1990] slightly modified version of Habermas's original), is
reproduced in the Figure 3.
Figure 3 (about here)
In respect of the content of the Figure 3 White [1990] explains that, according to
Habermas, "Marx has analysed the reifying effects of systemic integration only on one
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role (no. 1), Weber added another (no.3)". But "in order to comprehend the true
dimensions of the loss of freedom in advanced capitalism", according to Habermas, "one
must take into account all four roles and their changing relationships, as well as changing
relationships between the two subsystems" (White, [1990, p.108]). It is White [1990],
particularly in his chapter five (v), who has most thoroughly clarified the recent works of
Habermas to the English speaking world, and is so doing has provided some additional
insights into Habermas's extended thoughts on the subject of 'modernity'.
As an intermediate reflection the hypothesis that Habermas has advanced is that a social
evolution occurs through a two-level process of differentiation. On the one level,
according to Habermas, there is a growing differentiation between the lifeworld and
system aspects of society, a "decoupling of system and lifeworld". Thus, he sees that the
mechanisms of functional integration are increasingly detached from the lifeworld
structures, which need social integration or else congeal into quasi-autonomous
subsystems of economic and administrative activity. On the other, he argues that there is
a progressive differentiation within the dimensions of a lifeworld and a system
themselves. He further maintains that these two levels do not simply lie parallel to one
another, they are interconnected. Thus, he argues, the systemic mechanisms have to be
anchored in the lifeworld, that is, institutionalized. This institutionalization, according to
Habermas, is a necessary condition of system integration, that is, of formally organised
subsystems of purposive-rational economic and administrative action, which need to be
rationalized in the lifeworld. It is this hypothesis which needs pragmatic reification. In
other words, how a particular (micro) organisation is balancing its functional
interconnection with the 'lifeworld' per se, needs pragmatic corroboration.
It is worth mentioning that Habermas (elsewhere) is careful in considering the situation
where 'collective bargaining' is present. It seems he wants to advance more insights in
the area where such bargaining situations do not exist at all in the occidental societies;
including the area of 'juridification' (as cited several times about German Law). This
automatically raise a question as to 'how can one adapt Habermas's critical framework in
an organizational analysis, where there may exist a strong bargaining situation (for at
least resource allocation purposes). At the same time, it can be argued that even if such a
bargaining situation did exist, it cannot be claimed that the 'lifeworld' that is surrounded
by the locale (the researched organisation) is totally rationalised in Habermasian sense.
If we consider Habermas's thesis of the relations between the 'system' and the 'lifeworld',
and its interrelations; we cannot eschew the fact that the relations between the systems
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and the lifeworld surrounding a particular micro (large) organisation might have the
similar effects at the societal (meta) level. That is, we cannot assume that the locale's
every communicative action is reflecting Habennas's "rationalised lifeworld'. This
cannot be reified by nonnative prescription only, it need pragmatic reification.
According to White [1990], "the kind of reification Habennas wants to illuminate occurs
to the degree that the expansion of systematic integration begins to undermine functions
essential to the reproduction of a rationalised lifeworld. The mediatization of the
lifeworld takes the form of a 'colonisation of the lifeworld' when the systematic media of
money and power begin to displace communicative sociation in core spheres of action
within which the three processes of symbolic reproduction takes place: cultural
transmission, social integration and socialisation. The 'communicative infrastructure' of a
rationalised lifeworld is constituted by understanding-oriented action which create a
rational context for the 'transference of validity' through these three processes. Such a
transfer of rational motivation (in a communicative sense) is only possible ... when
actors take up a perfonnative attitude toward other subjects and their validity claims.
Actions which is coordinated by money and power, on the other hand, requires only an
objectivating attitude and an orientation for success" [pp.109-110].
In this way "it is the colonization processes of lifeworld reproduction which generates the
peculiar pathologies of advanced capitalism" (White,[1990, p.lIO]). Some accounting
researchers, especially Broadbent et al. [1990], Laughlin [199Oa] and Chua and Degeling
[1990], have already considered this 'colonisation' issue in theorising and explaining
accounting based intervention. Thus, the proposed research project is intended to further
elaborate Habermas's thesis of colonisation with special reference to a micro-
organisational level. Nevertheless, it will also deal with the questions forwarded by
White [1990, p.lIO] such as:
(1) Why does Habennas say that communicative sociation 'cannot be
replaced' by sociation through money and power in central areas of
lifeworld reproduction?
(2) How is the pressure toward colonization linked up with an analysis of
the specific qualities of advanced capitalism?
(3) What exactly does Habermas mean by colonization of the lifeworld?
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In addition, it is also intended to further explore the processes of how such a thesis of
colonisation can be enhanced (and/or reflected) in understanding and changing the
(management) accounting craft at a practical level, especially in the case of a micro
organisational systems level.
Conclusion:
This paper makes no claim to propose a generalizable case; rather, it is a propaedeutic
paper aimed at understanding and thinking about the critical accounting literature. In an
endeavour to so do, it illuminates some of the characteristics, diversities and nature of the
critical accounting literature.
In addition, a central concern that has been advanced throughout this paper is that
organisational analysis can be seen as a necessary prerequisite of research in accounting.
A reason is that the organisation(s) is (are) at the root of other meaningful yet uncertain
social and political considerations which are essential to an understanding of accounting.
An implicit motivation of this paper can be seen as an initial kick/jolt in an endeavour to
embark on a study in accounting and control systems research arena using 'critical social
theory' as a framework.
In reviewing some previous critical accounting literature the paper suggests that it is not
only Burrell and Morgan's [1979] paradigm of social theory, that provides the necessary
assumptions for perspective choices, but there is a need for a further understanding about
the nature of the context (say in our case organisational culture) in choosing such
perspective(s) and formulating any approach to research in such settings. Thus, a
prescriptive understanding on the nature of (micro) organisational 'culture' and its
transition processes has been advanced; one which seems to be very useful in
formulating a research approach and choosing perspective(s).
A further argument has been advanced in the form of the question of whether the concept
of organisational change and change in a discipline that is to corne can be considered
parallel? This interogation leads to the argument that from, a 'research student
perspective', the student cannot start his/her major research in a vacuum and needs to
illuminate the existing thought and theories that prevail in the respective discipline or
wing in which the research is being undertaken. And, finally, an example of a (partial)
research proposal is cited following a Habermasian critical approach in order show of
how such an approach be utilised as a framework.
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Figure 1 The Four Paradigm ofSocial Theory From Burrel and Morgan (1979)
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Figure 3 Habermas's Framework about the Relation Between system and
lifeworldfrom a systems perspective
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ENDNOTES:
1. That is to name a few: Hopwood [1978, 1979, 1983, 1986], Tinker 1980, Burchell et
al., [1980], Cooper & Sherer [1984], Neimark & Tinker [1986], Chua [1986], Miller and
O'Leary[1987], Cooper [1981], Cooper and Hopper [1987], Laughlin [1987, 1988],
Boland and Pondy [1986], Boland [1990], Covaleski and Dirsmith [1988], Broadbent et
al., [1990].
2. Those in the social sciences who utilize the 'empirical-analytic' method (which is
analogous to the experimental modality of natural sciences) are generally considered as
'positivists' (and/or logical positivists). The term 'empirical-analytic' method strictly
means empirical modelling a situation for theory testing and this method has been used as
instrument for behavioural analyses or cognitive enquiry and it is what Burrell and
Morgan [1979] classified as 'functionalism'. According to Suppe [1977], a central
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characteristic activity of the positivists' method is "the use of reason in the suggestion and
development of hypotheses and theories and evaluating the knowledge claims by those
who advance such hypotheses and theories" (p.650). In accounting there have been those
who have used the positivists' ontology and epistemology to discover what they believe
to be "a knowable and objective reality" (Chua [1986]). They have included those
working in various areas such as: (1) contingency theory (see Khandwal1a [1972], Burns
and Waterhouse [1975], Hayes [1977], Daft and MacIntosh [1978], Kenis [1979],
Merchant [1981], Brownell [1981], Gordon and Narayanan [1984], Govindarajan [1984],
Jones [1985], Brownell and MacInnes [1986], Hirst [1983], Teoh and Lam [1989]; (2)
muti-cue probability learning theories (see Hoskins [1983], Kessler and Ashton [1981],
Harrell [1977], Libby [1975]); (3) efficient capital markets research (see Gonedes
[1974], Beaver and Dukes [1973], Fama [1970], Ball and Brown [1968]); and (4) agency
theory (see Baiman [1982], Zimmerman [1979], Demski and Feltham [1978]).
3. Obviously such dysfunctions are not only a common characteristic in accounting but
also a common feature of most disciplines in social sciences.
4. It is to be mentioned that functionally 'knowing' and 'acting' is not a single act. These
are already divorced from positivism which claims that 'knowing' and 'acting' are a single
act, especially at the level of instrumental and communicative action (Habermas [1978,
p.212]).
5. In this sense, one may find some similarity with P. Feyerabend who argue against
'methodism' and 'subject object ideology'. It is to be pointed out that there exist, at least in
one point, dissimilarities between Paul Feyerabend and The Frankfurt Social School,
especially with Habennas in that the former believes that the 'epistemological anarchism'
(Feyerabend [1975, p.168]) is not necessary as a criterion for acceptable knowledge
claim, but for Habennas it is a necessary postulate, otherwise there might be a possibility
of overlapping.
6. The term tangible is used in the literature. However, we prefer the term visible as it
avoids any unneccessary ontological connotations and serve to stand in contradistinction
to invsible.
7. A future research project will focus on how a Habermasian framework would enhance
our understanding about such (yet uncertain) processes.
8. It seems it is a long (rather slow) process to get there, that is, to see Habermas's
'rationalised lifeworld' or change of 'evolution' in the terminology of Smith [1982] and
Laughlin [1990a] or strategic 'reorientation' change in the terminology of Dent [1990].
1
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9. In the previous discussion several propositions have been proposed regarding a future
research project. It may be that many more need to be proposed. This suggests that it
might be a reason why critical accounting researchers are amazed at the 'positivistic'
notion of the identification of the problems beforehand. However, the ultimate concern
of the project is to reflect Habennas's theory of 'colonization'. Habennas suggests a
model for societal 'totality', but we will analyse uncertain relationships within a locale.
10. According to Weber, societal rationalisation was identified with growing purposive
rationalisation. But for Habennas such an identification is not necessary. One can,
Habennas argues, open up the question of whether purposive rationalisation is only
possible way of developing that broader potential for the rationalisation of action which
is made available with the culture of modernity. This suggests that Habennas did not
totally reject Weber, as he did not for others such as Marx and Mead.
